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Abstract
I propose a new estimation method for nite sequential games that is e¢ cient,
computationally attractive, and applicable to a fairly general class of nite sequential
games that is beyond the scope of existing studies. The major challenge is computa-
tion of high-dimensional truncated integration whose domain is complicated by strate-
gic interaction. This complication resolves when unobserved o¤-the-equilibrium-path
strategies are controlled for. Separately evaluating the likelihood contribution of each
subgame-perfect equilibrium that generates the observed outcome allows the use of the
GHK simulator, a widely used importance-sampling probit simulator. Monte Carlo
experiments demonstrate the performance and robustness of the proposed method.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I study the structural estimation of nite sequential games and propose a new
estimation method that is e¢ cient, computationally attractive, and applicable to a fairly
general class of nite sequential games that is beyond the scope of existing studies. Existing
empirical studies that consider sequential games (at least as an addition to simultaneous
games) range over the entry of rms (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991; Berry, 1992; Mazzeo, 2002;
Maruyama, 2011), technology adoption (Schmidt-Dengler, 2006), the labor participation of
couples (Kooreman, 1994; Hiedeman, 1998), the retirement behavior of elderly couples (Jia,
2005), the location choice of siblings (Konrad et al., 2002; Maruyama and Johar, 2013),
political science and international relations (Signorino and Tarar, 2006; Bas et al., 2008),
tax competition (Kempf and Rota-Graziosi, 2010), and the validity of subgame perfection
in experimental economics (Andreoni and Blanchard, 2006). All of the existing literature
on sequential games has so far focused on simple cases where: the number of players is very
small (two in most cases); the game structure is very simple (e.g. a binary choice symmetric
game); or emphasis is not on the structural estimation of strategic e¤ect.1
The class of games I study in this paper is nite sequential games, i.e., nite-horizon
pure-strategy discrete-choice sequential games with perfect information, in which each player
makes a decision in publicly known exogenous decision order. The econometrician knows
the decision order and uses data on players and their decisions to estimate a parametric
1Exceptions are Maruyama (2011) and Maruyama and Johar (2013), which are based on the approach
outlined in this paper.
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model of payo¤s and random components. The random components serve as structural
errors that are observed by players, but not by the econometrician. Conceptually, solving
such sequential games is straightforward by backward induction. When the random errors
follow continuous distribution, such as multivariate normal distribution, the game becomes
even simpler to solve, because ties occur with probability measure zero and there always
exists a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Once the relationship from realized values
of the random errors to a unique equilibrium outcome is established, the remaining task
is simply to seek parameter values that minimize a certain distance metric between the
predicted and observed game outcomes. Computationally, however, except for extremely
simple games, estimating sequential games is challenging. Even for a fairly simple game
in which four players sequentially make binary decisions, the standard maximum likelihood
method is not feasible because the likelihood function does not have an analytical solution
due to high-dimensional integration. Maximum likelihood based on simulation techniques
is an alternative, but its computation is a daunting task; the game needs to be solved for
each observation of game plays for each simulation draw for each set of candidate parameter
values.
The proposed method in this paper relies on two ideas. First, I propose the use of the
Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator, the most popular solution for approximating
high-dimensional truncated integrals in standard probit models. This importance-sampling
simulator recursively truncates the multivariate normal probability density function, by de-
composing the multivariate normal distribution into a set of univariate normal distribution
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using Cholesky triangularization.
Sequential strategic interaction, however, complicates high-dimensional truncated inte-
gration in the probit framework, causing interdependence of truncation thresholds, which
undermines the ground of the GHKs recursive conditioning approach. As the second build-
ing block of the proposed method, I propose the use of the GHK simulator not for the
observed equilibrium outcome per se, but separately for each of all the subgame-perfect
strategy proles that rationalize the observed equilibrium outcome. In the sequential game
framework, the observed equilibrium outcome arises according to the underlying subgame-
perfect equilibrium, but the econometrician does not observe the underlying equilibrium,
because an equilibrium strategy consists of a complete contingent plan, which includes o¤-
the-equilibrium-path strategies as unobserved counterfactuals. Even if a unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium is guaranteed, from the econometricians viewpoint, there may exist
di¤erent realizations of unobservables that lead to di¤erent subgame-perfect equilibria that
generate an observationally identical game outcome.
The use of subgame perfection allows us to uniquely determine the corresponding subgame-
perfect equilibrium for each realization of random components. I show that the separate
evaluation of likelihood contribution for each subgame-perfect strategy prole allows us to
control for the unobserved o¤-the-equilibrium-path strategies so that the recursive condition-
ing of the GHK works by making the domain of Monte Carlo integration (hyper-)rectangular.
The econometrician then obtains the probability of the observed outcome by summing the
probabilities of each equilibrium that rationalizes the observed outcome, and the use of
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maximum likelihood follows.
Section 2 positions the proposed method in the empirical game literature and discusses
the potential usefulness of the method. After formally presenting the setup in Section 3,
I explain in Section 4 how the GHK simulator can aid high-dimensional integration under
subgame perfection. In Section 5, to demonstrate the performance and robustness of the pro-
posed estimation method, I conduct Monte Carlo experiments. Section 6 discusses potential
extension and computation issues.
2 RELATIONTOTHE LITERATUREANDAPPLICA-
BILITY
This paper builds on a line of research on the estimation of non-cooperative discrete games,
initiated by Bjorn and Vuong (1984) and Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). Recent development
in this literature has mostly centered around two issues: the identication problem due to
multiple equilibria2 and the computation problem. This paper contributes to the latter by
providing a direction di¤erent from recent developments. There is a very active literature
on the estimation of dynamic discrete games. Recent work by Pesendorfer and Schmidt-
Dengler (2003), Pakes et al. (2007), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), and Bajari et al.
(2007) is based on a computationally convenient two-step approach, developed by Hotz and
Miller (1993), which exploits the mapping in discrete-choice problems between conditional
2For example, see Chernozhukov et al. (2007), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), and Pakes et al. (2011).
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choice probabilities and choice-specic value functions. The computational advantage of this
type of method comes from the fact that it only uses necessary conditions of equilibrium
and does not explicitly compute equilibrium. Two general drawbacks to these estimators
are the information loss that may lead to substantial nite sample bias and the di¢ culty of
conducting counterfactual simulations. The approach proposed in this paper, although its
computational advantage depends on each application, does not have these drawbacks as it
is based on the explicit calculation of equilibrium.
The recent work by Jia (2008) on the location choice of discount chains has some simi-
larities to this paper in that she studies a discrete simultaneous complete-information game
with a large choice set. Her innovative approach to the dimensionality problem relies on
the lattice theory. For her approach to work, however, the model has to satisfy several
strong restrictions.3 Similarly, the literature on incomplete-information static games com-
putes equilibrium by using xed point theorem (e.g. Seim, 2007). The xed point algorithm
works well as long as the underlying assumptions are satised. My approach, on the other
hand, relies on the backward induction algorithm to nd equilibrium, a conceptually much
simpler approach, which works in a fairly general class of nite sequential games.
Whether sequentiality is a reasonable assumption to make depends on each application.
In entry games, for example, there may not be an explicit sequence in the rst place. It may
be natural that the recent empirical game literature has centered around the identication
issue under the possibility of multiple equilibria. The sequential game assumption allows
3In Jias setup, externality across markets must be positive and the number of players cannot exceed two.
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this paper to circumvent the issue of multiple equilibria but the validity of the assumption
needs to be warranted in each application.
More importantly, however, the sequential game framework is not merely a technical
assumption to avoid multiple equilibria but a tool to investigate sequential strategic inter-
action, such as the rst-mover (dis-)advantage and preemptive behavior to deter a rivals
action. Sequential strategic interaction is observed in a wide range of real world phenomena:
heavily regulated industries, organizational decision making, labor disputes, judicial cases,
decisions among siblings, drafts in sports leagues, parlor and TV show games, and so on.
Innumerable theoretical studies on sequential games exist, but there has been little empirical
work devoted to quantifying the relevance and implications of sequential interaction.
It is worthwhile to point out that the proposed method does not fully resolve the high
dimensionality problem. The GHK signicantly facilitates high-dimensional integration, but
as the game size increases, the number of possible strategy proles increases exponentially.
Although there are ways to further improve computational e¢ ciency, as discussed in the last
section, computational practicality remains a challenge when a game is very large.4
The benet of the proposed method will be fully exploited when an application focuses
on sequential interaction in a middle-sized game, which is not overly large but if larger than
the two-player binary-choice game. On one hand, the two-player Stackelberg game, which
has been widely studied in the theoretical literature, has limited use in empirical research.
On the other hand, an application with a game played by a large number of players may
4The maximum size of the game a researcher can practically estimate depends on various factors, such
as imposed game structures, the sample size, and the availability of high-performance computing.
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entail less value in inference on sequential interaction; a simultaneous game framework may
be more appropriate for such a game.
The paper by Maruyama and Johar (2013) o¤ers an example of the intended use of
the proposed method. The paper concerns the location choice of adult siblings. In our
setup, adult siblings make location decisions in their birth order the order they nish
their schooling while the well-being of their elderly parents is their shared concern. This
setting creates a public good problem and sequential strategic interaction. While statistical
inferences are based on a quite large data set, the game is not large: we consider families
with up to four siblings and the decision is binary whether to live far away from the parent
or not. The model, instead, features very rich heterogeneity. The error term has a complex
covariance structure in which correlation among siblings depends on their characteristics,
such as age and gender di¤erences. We do not impose a priori assumption on strategic
complementarity, allowing families to play di¤erent types of games. The proposed algorithm
performs very well, leading us to nd economically insignicant sequential interaction but a
signicant public good problem.
In the rest of the paper I repeatedly use entry game examples. Readers should note that
this is primarily for illustration purposes. I employ the entry game examples because of
their simple form as a discrete game that is a well-understood classic in the empirical game
literature (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991; Berry, 1992). The applicability and fruitfulness of
the nite sequential game framework depends on each application.
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3 MODEL
3.1 The Sequential Game
The model is a nite sequential game with perfect information. There are i = 1; :::; N players,
each makes a decision in publicly known exogenous order. The game can be set up so that
players take multiple turns alternately. Each player chooses an "action" ai from a nite set
of actions Ai, e.g. ("left", "right") and ("enter", "not enter").5 Dene A  iAi and let
a  (a1; :::; aN) denote a generic element of A. Player is payo¤, such as utility or prot,
from action ai depends on a i, the vector of actions taken by the other players. The payo¤
function of player i, i : A! R, is
i (a; x; "i; 1) = i (a; x; 1) + "
ai
i ; (1)
where 1 is a vector of parameters and vector x contains exogenous characteristics that
describe the players and the environment in which the game is played. The rst term,
i (a; x; 1), is an assumed parametric function of mean payo¤s. The second term, "
ai
i 2 R, is
a random preference shock player i incurs when ai is chosen. Dene a vector, "i  f"aii gai2Ai
and "  ("1; :::; "N). " follows continuous parametric density function, g ("; 2), where 2
is a vector of parameters.6,7 Both x and " are common knowledge to the players, but the
5Allowing the choice set to vary across decision nodes is a straightforward extention.
6g ("; 2) may depend on x as well.
7I assume the additive separability of the random shock term following much of the existing literature,
such as Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). In the following discussion, this assumption is not essential as long as
the identication of parameter estimates is established.
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econometrician observes only x.
All the game theoretical concepts used in this paper are textbook standard, except for
"action prole", a, dened above, which records decisions made on the equilibrium path (but
not o¤-the-equilibrium-path decisions) and corresponds to what the econometrician observes
as a game outcome in data, whether the game is sequential or simultaneous. An extensive-
form game is a perfect-information game if every information set is a singleton decision node.
With perfect information, every decision made earlier is observable for the following players.
Player is (pure) strategy, si 2 Si, species her decision at each decision node.8 Dene S 
iSi and let s  (s1; :::; sN) 2 S denote a strategy prole. Since s uniquely determines a game
outcome, dene a (s) : S ! A and ai (s) : S ! Ai. In the example of a two-player sequential
entry game, if sleader = ("In") and sfollower = ("In" if leader stays out; "Out" if leader enters),
then a (s) = (In;Out).
Given the primitives dened above, each player chooses a strategy si that maximizes the
payo¤ taking rivalsstrategies as given. The solution concept of the game in this paper is
subgame perfection, which is a renement of Nash equilibrium to exclude certain strategies
such as noncredible threat. A subgame of an extensive-form game with perfect information
is a subset of the game that begins with a single decision node, contains all the decision
nodes that are successors of this node, and contains only these nodes. A subgame-perfect
equilibrium, se, is a strategy prole in which each players strategy is the best response to
the strategies of the other players in every subgame. It is a well-known fact that every
8Incorporating mixed strategies in the present framework is computationally impractical and beyond the
scope of this paper.
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nite game with perfect information has a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium (Zer-
melos theorem). Furthermore, in the current setup, the game almost surely has a unique
equilibrium, because ties occur with probability measure zero. Denote this subgame-perfect
equilibrium, se (x; "; 1), and its ith component, sei (x; "; 1). An equilibrium outcome func-
tion is also dened as ae (x; "; 1)  a (se (x; "; 1)), with its ith component, aei (x; "; 1).
Given (x; "; 1), the game can be solved to obtain se by backward induction. In other words,
given (x; 1), a realization of " results in a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium.
3.2 Data
The econometrician observes T independent realizations of the game, ( 1; :::; T ), e.g., T
di¤erent markets, T di¤erent families, and T periods of time. Each realization of the game
is indexed by t = 1; :::; T . The structure and environment of the game may vary across t in
terms of the number and identity of players, the choice set of each player, the decision order,
and covariates x. The parametric forms of i (at; xt; "it; 1) and gi ("
ait
i ; 2) and parameters,
  (1; 2), are assumed to be invariant across t to draw statistical inferences. In each t,
the econometrician observes equilibrium outcome aot and covariate vector xt. Equilibrium
strategy seit is not observed as it contains counterfactuals. The econometrician knows the
structure of game  t, such as the number of players and the decision order either from
institutional knowledge, by assumption, or from observation of data. In the following, I drop
the subscript for each game, t, when no ambiguity arises.
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To utilize a probit simulator below, I assume a normal distribution for "t as
"t  N (0;
) : (2)
Covariance matrix 
 has a dimension of Ni=1 [the number of alternatives for i] and is para-
meterized by 2. For the parameterization of 
, the standard identication conditions of
probit models apply. In particular, the fact that payo¤ it is an unobserved latent construct
means that what the econometrician can infer from observed decisions concerns only the
relative comparison of payo¤s among alternatives, and consequently requires normalization
of the mean and variance of ".9 For example, in the setup of standard binary-choice games,
the dimension of 
 is the number of players. Below, I abuse notation and use " and 
 to
denote the error structure after normalization.
3.3 Estimation and the High-Dimensional Integration
The task of the econometrician is to make statistical inferences on  based on the structure
of game  t and the assumed parametric forms of i (a; x; "i; 1) and gi ("
ai
i ; 2). Since the
distribution of " is specied fully parametrically, the estimation procedure relies on maximum
likelihood. Game  t is the unit for which individual likelihood is dened as follows:
l (;xt; a
o




t (xt; "t; 1) j2] . (3)
9In applications with more model structures, information on the level of payo¤s may be available and aid
identication, making the normalization of the variance of error terms unnecessary.
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This leads to the following maximum likelihood problem:












The challenge in this maximum likelihood framework is that the probability term in (3)
involves high-dimensional integrals and generally does not have an analytical solution. The
dimension depends on the number of players and the number of alternatives each player has.
There are several cases where this likelihood function is easily computed. First is the two-
dimensional case (Stackelberg games), which arises if the number of players is two and the
decision to be made is binary. The econometrician can then solve the two threshold values
for ("1t; "2t) in accordance with the observed equilibrium outcome, aot . The bivariate normal
distribution function then produces an analytical solution for the probability term. If the
dimension of integration increases to three, an analytical solution is generally not available,
but the quadrature method enables numerical approximation. Another special case is when
each stochastic component in "t follows an independent univariate normal distribution. In
this case, though the game still needs to be solved for an equilibrium, once it is solved,
obtaining an analytical solution is trivial. In most applications, however, the independent
normal assumption is restrictive. It implies no game specic error (e.g. market specic
random component), and when the choice set is larger than the binary case, it also implies
a quite restrictive substitution pattern among alternatives.
For high-dimensional integration, the literature has developed the maximum simulated
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likelihood (MSL) method, which utilizes Monte Carlo integration.10 The most straightfor-
ward simulator for MSL is the crude frequency simulator, rst proposed by Lerman and
Manski (1981). This simulation procedure takes R sets of random draws from the assumed
distribution. For each random draw e"rt , an equilibrium outcome aet is solved by backward
induction. The probability simulator is based on how many times the predicted equilibrium
outcome coincides with the observed outcome out of R times repetition of simulation draws.
Although this simulator provides estimates that are consistent with R and T , it has two
major limitations. First, the simulated probability is a discontinuous function of the para-
meters and is not bounded away from 0 and 1. Second, the use of the indicator function
makes the variance of this simulator quite large, especially in high-dimensional cases. As
a result of these problems, Lerman and Manski (1981) nd that their estimator requires a
very large number of simulations for satisfactory performance. McFadden (1989) develops
smoothed simulators that solve the discontinuity problem. Smoothed simulators simplify the
iterative computation of the estimator, allowing researchers to use an optimization method
that relies on the di¤erentiability of the optimand. McFaddens (1989) smoothed simulators,
however, do not address the large variance problem in high-dimensional cases. Since a likeli-
hood evaluation of relatively large asymmetric extensive form games tends to be particularly
expensive, these simulators are practically infeasible.
10The method of simulated moments (MSM) and the method of simulated scores (MSS) are alternative
options. These may improve the nite sample property of estimators by removing the simulation bias that
results from the logarithm in the log likelihood function (Hajivassiliou and McFadden, 1998), though Geweke
et al. (1994) do not nd such an advantage of MSM over MSL.
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3.4 The GHK Simulator
For high-dimensional integration over a region of the multivariate normal, the most pop-
ular simulator is the GHK simulator (Geweke, 1992; Hajivassiliou and McFadden, 1994;
and Keane, 1994). The GHK simulator recursively truncates the multivariate normal prob-
ability density function. Its algorithm draws recursively from truncated univariate normal
distributions, and relies on Cholesky triangularization to decompose the multivariate normal
distribution into a set of univariate normal distributions. The combination of the recursive
conditioning approach and the algorithm to generate a smooth univariate truncated variate
produces an unbiased and smooth importance-sampling simulator. Importance sampling
aims to achieve higher e¢ ciency by adjusting the weight or "importance" of di¤erent points
in the sample space. Compared with the frequency simulator, the GHK simulator requires
remarkably fewer draws for alternatives with low probability of being chosen. A number
of studies have conrmed its usefulness and relative accuracy, especially when considering
the low computational e¤ort required (Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou, 1993; Geweke et al.,
1994; Hajivassiliou et al., 1996; Hajivassiliou and McFadden, 1998).
The complication in using the GHK simulator for empirical games stems from the recur-
sive conditioning approach. The GHK algorithm repeats recursive simulation draws from
truncated univariate normal distributions so that the resulting random shocks, e"r, generate
the observed equilibrium outcome, ao. The requirement for this recursive conditioning is
that, in the " space, the truncation threshold for each simulation draw is independent of
other simulation draws and hence, the truncation thresholds are orthogonal to each other.
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However, because of sequential strategic interaction, the truncation threshold for a draw may
depend on other simulation draws, and recursive conditioning simulation breaks down.
4 USING THE GHK SIMULATOR
The problem of interdependent truncation thresholds arises as a result of changes in un-
observed o¤-the-equilibrium-path strategies. Before formally presenting the general case
results, I illustrate this point by a simple two-player entry game. Note that this two-player
entry game is only for explanation purposes, as the game is two-dimensional and its likelihood
function can easily be solved analytically.
The entry game is played by two players, rm 1 and rm 2. Firm 1 is the Stackelberg
leader. Having observed rm 1s entry decision, rm 2 makes its entry decision. Firms 1
and 2 incur random shocks "1 and "2 respectively in their prot functions. For illustration
purposes, assume that the rivals entry reduces payo¤ (this is not essential for the proposed
method). Each rm enters the market when it expects nonnegative prots from entry. If it
does not enter, a rm earns zero prot. Given the assumed payo¤ functions, the realized
values of "1 and "2 determine which market outcome occurs (Figure 1). A rm with a larger
random shock is more likely to enter the market. However, the e¤ects of "1 and "2 are
not symmetric and the decisions of the two rms are not independent of each other, due
to the sequential nature of the game. The center part of Figure 1 shows the asymmetry;
when neither "1 nor "2 has dominating impact, only rm 1, the leader with the rst-mover
advantage, enters. In this example, the probability of market conguration (Out,In) cannot
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be computed by the GHK simulator directly, because the domain of integration is not a
rectangle, and thus drawing "1 cannot be conditional on "2 and vice versa.
[Insert Figure 1]
The notion of subgame perfection solves this dependency. Indeed, this non-rectangular
shaped domain of integration stems from a behavioral change in an o¤-the-equilibrium path.
The strategic interaction in this sequential game is illustrated by its extensive form (Figure
2). With perfect information, rm 2 has two singleton decision nodes, and the choice set
of rm 2 consists of four strategies: "never enter", "imitate", "preempted", and "always
enter". Assuming "Out" for rm 1, Figure 2 shows four possible equilibria. The extensive
form highlights several important facts. First, subgame perfection implies that rm 2 chooses
the best strategy based on its random shock, "2, irrespective of "1. Facing a large negative
shock, rm 2 chooses "never enter". For a large positive shock, rm 2 chooses "always enter".
For a medium value of "2, rm 2 chooses "preempted", i.e. it enters the market only if rm
1 does not.11 Thus, "1 does not a¤ect the thresholds of "2 that determine the choice of rm
2. Second, di¤erent strategy proles may generate game outcomes that are observationally
equivalent to the econometrician. In Figure 2, strategy proles (3) and (4) both result in
(Out,In). Third, rm 1s decision does depend on the strategy of rm 2, and hence, it does
depend on "2. When preemption is possible, the entry threshold for rm 1 is lower and the
integration domain of "1 is larger. However, if the strategy of rm 2 is given, the threshold
of "1 does not depend on the value of "2.
11Firm 2 never chooses the "imitate" strategy, due to the assumed negative impact of a rivals entry.
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[Insert Figure 2]
Figure 3 incorporates these considerations into the ("1; "2) space. Now the (Out,In) area is
divided into two rectangles, each representing di¤erent strategy proles, i.e. (3) "preempted"
and (4) "always enter" as named in Figure 2. The standard GHK procedure works as long
as the domain of integration is rectangular (or hyperrectangular in a general n-dimensional
space) and therefore, we can simulate the likelihood function by evaluating each subgame
perfect equilibrium separately.
[Insert Figure 3]
To formalize the discussion so far in the general n-dimensional case, let s i denote the
subvector of strategy prole s that excludes component i, and let sBRi (x; "i; s i; 1) denote
the function that determines the best response strategy of player i given x; "i; and s i. Given
(x; "i; s i), the best response strategy of player i is uniquely determined almost surely by
comparing payo¤s at each decision node. Then, the following result holds.
Proposition 1 For any strategy prole s 2 S, if there exists a set of f"g that rationalizes
s as a subgame-perfect strategy prole given x and 1, then











In words, the set of " under which s solves the game as a subgame-perfect equilibrium can be
written as a Cartesian product of each players set of "i under which si is the best response
strategy to s i.
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Proof. In a nite sequential game with continuous random unobservables, player is best
response strategy is uniquely determined by s i; x; and "i almost surely. Thus, given s i
and x, the set of "i under which si is the best response strategy to s

 i does not depend on
another players component of ". Then the proposition follows trivially.
The logic underlying this proposition comes directly from the Nash equilibrium concept,
not specically from subgame perfection. However, for this result to hold, the best response
needs to be uniquely determined. The subgame perfection (and hence the assumption of
a sequential game) plays the key role in avoiding indeterminacy from the " space to each
players best response.12
The main virtue of the proposition is that for any observed market outcome, ao, by di-
viding the integration problem into the subgame-perfect equilibria that rationalize ao, the
interdependency of integral intervals across players resolves and the standard GHK proce-
dure can be used. When the econometrician ignores subgame perfection and only considers
observed actions, ao, the realized value of "j may change player js o¤-the-equilibrium-path
decisions, which in turn a¤ects the set of "i under which player i chooses aoi on her equilib-
rium path. The proposition claries that this interdependency across players does not occur
as far as each subgame-perfect equilibrium is concerned.
To obtain bML using Monte Carlo integration, the estimation procedure evaluates the
GHK simulator for every strategy prole that rationalizes observed outcome aot . Let S
o (a) 
fs 2 Sja (s) = ag. Rewrite the individual likelihood in the original maximum likelihood








Pr [s = se(x; "; 1)j2] .
The second equality holds owing to the fact that any " leads to a unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium. Given the discussion so far, using the GHK simulator for each subgame-perfect
equilibrium is trivial. The rest of this section sets out this standard procedure to evalu-
ate Pr [s = se(x; "; 1)j2] for each s 2 So (ao). Readers familiar with the standard GHK
procedure can turn directly to the Monte Carlo experiments.
The probability that the event, s = se(x; "; 1), occurs can be rewritten using an integral.
Let n (";
) denote the probability density function of the multivariate normal variates, ";
with zero mean and covariance matrix 
. Then
Pr [s = se(x; "; 1)j2] =
Z













The last equality holds from the proposition. Covariance matrix 
 (2) takes a parametric
form of 2 that allows identication. Dening a seti (x; s; 1) 

"ijsBRi (x; "i; s i; 1) = si
	
;
Pr [s = se(x; "; 1)j2] =
Z Y
i
I ["i 2 i(x; s; 1)]n (";
 (2)) d".
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The set i(x; s; 1) represents the conditions that random shocks "i needs to satisfy for si
to be player is best response given s 1. The derivation of i(x; s; 1) is based on nding
thresholds of "i by comparing payo¤s across available strategies given s 1. There may be
a strategy that is dominated by another strategy regardless of the value of "i. For such a
dominated strategy si, i(x; si; s i; 1) = ;, and strategy prole s that contains si occurs
with probability zero. Dene S
o
(ao; 1)  So (ao) as the set of strategy proles each element
of which leads to market outcome ao and occurs with positive probability. Then the likelihood
function becomes
l (;x; ao) =
X
s2So(ao)




Pr [s = se(x; "; 1)j2] .
In the following I focus on S
o
(ao; 1) so that i(x; s; 1) is not the empty set.
Before applying the GHK simulator, I introduce Cholesky decomposition. For the sim-
plicity of exposition, assume the choice set of player i = 1; :::; N is binary. Then, after
normalization, " 2 RN and 
 (2) is a N N matrix. Allowing more than two alternatives
is straightforward under the GHK procedure. Denote the lower-triangular Cholesky factor
of 
 (2) as L so that LL0 = 
 (2). Denote  = (1; :::; N) an N -dimensional multivariate
standard normal vector;   N (0; IN). Hence we can write " = L  N (0;
 (2)). I intro-
duce notation to simplify the following presentation. For a vector of indexes (1; :::; N), the
notation "< i" denotes the subvector (1; :::; i  1) and " i" denotes the subvector (1; :::; i).
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Thus, for a vector ", "<i is the subvector of the rst i 1 components, and " i is the subvector
excluding component i. For a matrix L; Lii is the i-th diagonal elements of L, and Li;<i and
Li;i denote vectors containing the rst i   1 and i elements of row i, respectively. Using
this notation, "i = Li;ii.
Then the probability expression becomes




























Li;ii 2 i(x; s; 1)
   (i) d;
where () is the probability density function of the univariate standard normal distribution.
The simulated likelihood with the GHK simulator is constructed as follows. For each
simulation, r = (1; :::; R), prepare an N -dimensional vector of independent uniform (0; 1)
random variables, eur = (eur1; :::; eurN). For u 2 (0; 1) and a non-empty set   R, dene
an inverse distribution function q (u;) which is a mapping that takes u into a truncated
standard normal distribution which ranges over . For example, if  = ( 1; a], then q ()
is a mapping into a standard normal random variate that is right-hand truncated at a, i.e.
q (u; ( 1; a]) =  1 ( (a)  u), where  (a) is the standard normal distribution function.




i (x; "i; s i; 1) for i = 1; :::; N as
er1  q (eur1; f1jL1;11 2 1 (x; s; 1)g)
er2  q (eur2; f2jL2;1er1 + L2;22 2 2 (x; s; 1)g)
:::
erN  q (eurN ; fN jLN;<Ner<N + LN;NN 2 N (x; s; 1)g) :
After obtaining simulated er, the probability for "i to satisfy si = sBRi (x; "i; s i; 1), which I
denote Qsi , is recursively calculated. For   R, dene 	 () 
R

 () d. For example, if
 = ( 1; a], then 	 () =  (a). Then
Qs1  	 (f1jL1;11 2 1 (x; s; 1)g)
Qs2 (er<2)  	 (f2jL2;1er1 + L2;22 2 2 (x; s; 1)g)
:::
QsN (er<N)  	 (fN jLN;<Ner<N + LN;NN 2 N (x; s; 1)g) :
Repeat this simulation R times for each element of S
o
(ao; 1) and dene the likelihood
simulator as













Using this simulator, the estimation procedure solves the following maximum simulated
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likelihood problem,







lnblGHKR (;xt; aot )
)
.
This maximum likelihood problem is solved using numerical derivatives. In searching b, each
iteration should use the same simulation draws
 eu1; :::; euR to minimize standard errors.
5 MONTE CARLO EXPERIMENTS
5.1 Experimental Design
In this section, I conduct Monte Carlo experiments and demonstrate the performance and
robustness of the estimation method presented in this paper. I pay particular attention to
(1) potential simulation bias in the Monte Carlo integration and (2) robustness with respect
to the misspecication of the decision order. The latter is especially important, as the precise
decision order may not be available in many empirical applications. Inspired by Berry (1992),
I employ a simple binary-choice entry game in the passenger airline industry, in which at
most six heterogeneous airline rms compete to serve di¤erent markets.
A market, dened as a city pair route that connects major U.S. cities, constitutes the unit
of observation. The six largest national carriers of di¤ering sizes (as dened by the number
of existing served routes) non-cooperatively play a sequential entry game independently in
each market, based on predicted protability in the market. The number of players in each
market varies from one to six. By construction, there is no distinction between entry by new
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entrants and "entry" by incumbent rms. The econometrician observes the list of "potential
entrants" and which rms choose to enter each market in the following year. Also available
are variables in the base period that explain the potential protability from entry. These
variables are either at the market level, rm level, or market-rm level. In the base model,
potential entrants make their decisions in order of size.
Twenty articial data sets are generated using pseudo-random numbers. Each data
set consists of 3,000 market observations and around 8,300 market-rm observations and
contains information on the list of potential entrants, covariates, and generated random
shocks in each market. Throughout all the experiments conducted below, I use the same
twenty data sets for better compatibility of the simulation results. I conduct three sets
of experiments. First, I examine the e¤ects of changing the simulation setting, such as
the number of simulation draws, to check the size of potential simulation bias. Second,
to study the e¤ect of misspecication, I impose restrictions on underlying models to be
estimated. Third, I introduce various degrees of randomness in the decision order to address
the possibility that the econometrician has only imprecise information about the true decision
order.
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5.2 Model and Data Generating Process
In market t, Nt rms play the entry game, where Nt 2 f1; : : : ; 6g. Firm i in market t chooses
to enter if it expects a non-negative prot. The expected prot from entry, it, is
it (n) = x
0
it    ln (n) + "it
where xit is a vector of covariates that are specic to either market t, rm i, or rm-market
pair (i; t), "it is the rm-market specic random component, and n is the number of rms
that choose to enter market t. The key parameter, , captures the strategic e¤ect. For
simplicity, the strategic e¤ect is assumed to depend only on the number of competitors, not
their identity. The random term "it is not observed by the econometrician but is known to
every rm, and follows a multivariate normal distribution: "t = ("1t; :::; "Nt;t)
0  N (0;
t).
The payo¤ when a rm does not enter is normalized to zero. The econometrician desires to
learn about ; ; and 
 based on observed entry decisions and xit.
The covariate vector contains the following variables: two market-specic continuous
variables, population (pop) and distance (dist); a rm-market specic continuous variable,
past protability in neighboring markets (pastp); a rm-market level dummy variable that
indicates the rms presence at both airports of the route in the previous period, city2; and
nroute, a rm-specic variable for the number of existing routes in the country (in 100s)
that indicates the size of each rm and determines the decision order.
Data on the pool of entrants and covariates are generated using pseudo-random numbers.
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For each of three thousand markets, I rst generate market population, pop, the number of
potential entrants, NCity1, and the number of potential entrants with a presence at two
airports, NCity2 based on trivariate normal distribution. These three variables are assumed





37777775 : For pop, generated
normal variable values are transformed to a log-normal variable with mean 4.0 and standard
deviation 1.0. To constrain the number of players in each market between one and six, the
two generated normal variables are transformed into truncated normal distributions. For
NCity1, the generated normal variable is transformed to a truncated normal variable with
mean 3.0 and standard deviation 1.5 and with the truncation points at 1.0 and 7.0. Like-
wise, for NCity2, the third generated normal variable is transformed to a truncated normal
variable with mean 1.5 and standard deviation 1.0 with truncation points at 0.0 and 7.0.
Both variables are then rounded down to integers. To guarantee NCity2  NCity1, NCity2
is replaced with the value of NCity1 where NCity2 > NCity1. The numbers of existing
routes, nroute, are set as (2:8; 2:5; 2:0; 1:7; 1:1; 0:75) for the six airlines. In each market,
potential entrants are randomly chosen up to the number of NCity1 with probabilities pro-
portional to nroute: This determines the list of players in each market. Potential entrants
with a presence at both airports of the market are also randomly chosen up to the number
of NCity2 (each rm with same probability). This generates the dummy variable, city2.
The two remaining variables, dist and pastp are independently generated from the standard
normal distribution.
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The error component "it is generated for the twenty data sets and is kept xed throughout
all experiments. The covariance matrix of the error component, 
t, is assumed to be aNtNt
matrix with diagonal elements, 1.0, and o¤-diagonal elements, 2. In other words, "it consists
of two independent standard normal errors, (it; t), as
"it =
p
(1  2)it + t
where  is a correlation among the error terms within a market and t measures a market-
specic factor that makes entry more attractive for all rms in the market. The correlation,
, is set to be 0.7, which implies it and t have about the same weights in the error term.
The coe¢ cients on (constant, pop; dist; pastp; city2; nroute) are set to be ( 5:0, 1:2, 0:0,
0:4, 1:5, 0:0). To highlight misspecication bias, the coe¢ cient on rm size, nroute, is set
to zero so that the rm size a¤ects prots not directly, only via the decision order. Once I
specify these parameter values, the value of the strategic e¤ect parameter, , and the decision
order, I can solve the game by backward induction and obtain the data on market outcomes.
The default specication is  = 2:0 and assumes that rms make decisions in order of nroute.
Tables 1 and 2 report descriptive numbers from one of the twenty articial data sets as
an example. Similar patterns are observed in the other data sets. The equilibrium number of
entrants presented in the tables is generated with two di¤erent values of , 1.0 and 2.0. The
majority of the three thousand markets have two or three potential entrants. A monopoly
is the most frequent outcome, with no entrant being the second likely outcome. The higher
value of  magnies the competitive e¤ect and leads to fewer entrants.
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[Insert Table 1]
Since the pool of potential entrants is constructed randomly but with probability propor-
tional to rm size, rm 1 appears in the data set most frequently and rm 6 least frequently
(Table 2). When  = 1:0, the early-mover advantages are smaller, so the entry propensity
does not vary much across rms, whereas when  = 2:0, the larger early-mover advantages
reduce the entry propensity of followers.
[Insert Table 2]
5.3 Results of the Experiments
The rst set of Monte Carlo experiments is based on the correct model specication and
concerns about the size of potential simulation bias inherent in the method of simulated
likelihood for a small number of simulation draws. A debate exists in the literature on the
choice between the method of simulated likelihood and the method of simulated moments.
While the method of simulated likelihood may su¤er from simulation bias given a xed
number of simulation draws, it is simple to implement, numerically stable, and potentially
e¢ cient under the correct specication. Geweke et al. (1997) and McFadden and Ruud
(1994) provide evidence of the instability of the method of simulated moment estimator.
Nevertheless, the number of simulation draws that will lead to a su¢ ciently small bias is an
empirical question specic to each application, and in particular depends on the complexity
of the covariance structure of error terms.
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Table 3 compares the estimates of four di¤erent simulation draw settings. The data
generating process assumes  = 2:0. The rst experiment makes twenty independent simula-
tion draws, while the second experiment uses antithetic sampling to make twenty simulation
draws, i.e. ten symmetric replications of ten independent pseudo-random draws to make
simulation draws more systematic. The results show that, rst, even with only twenty in-
dependent simulation draws, the comparison of the true parameter values and estimated
values indicates overall accuracy given the estimated standard errors. Second, the use of
antithetic sampling improves the model t in terms of the average log likelihood value and
reduces bias in terms of mean squared error. Third, increasing the number of draws to forty
and one hundred shows a further improvement in the t, though the improvement is small.
This pattern is consistently observed in simulations with di¤erent values of parameters and
di¤erent seeds of pseudo-random number generator. The results show accuracy even with
a very small number of simulation draws, because the covariance structure in the model is
simple and the correctly specied specication is used in these experiments. Though not
shown here, for a smaller value of , i.e. a smaller market level random e¤ect, the number of
simulation draws required to generate the same level of accuracy is even smaller, since the
distribution of each random error is closer to the univariate standard normal distribution.
[Insert Table 3]
The next series of experiments examines the e¤ect of misspecication by imposing re-
strictions on the correctly specied model (Table 4). The data generating process assumes
 = 2:0 and each estimation makes forty simulation draws using antithetic sampling. The
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rst restricted model assumes that the econometrician has no correct knowledge about the
decision order thus estimates the model by imposing a completely random decision order.
The lack of decision order information reduces the model t and leads to signicant bias of
most estimates. The serious underestimation of  and  and the overestimation of nroute are
particularly notable. In the data generating process, early movers enjoy their advantages,
but without correct information on the decision order, these advantages are not captured as
a strategic e¤ect in  and instead are captured in the positive coe¢ cient of nroute, which
determines the decision order but has no direct e¤ect on payo¤ in the true data generating
process. Inability to well explain the entry decision of each rm results in higher weights on
individual random components, which leads to the underestimation of . The two variables
that have no correlation with the decision order, dist and pastp, are nevertheless precisely
estimated, which is the case for all the experiments conducted below. The next restricted
model assumes the correct specication of the decision order but imposes zero market level
random e¤ect,  = 0. Since this restriction removes the correlation between multivari-
ate normal variates, high-dimensional integration is no longer necessary and the estimation
procedure is signicantly simplied. This misspecication, however, leads to considerable
reduction in the model t and signicant bias of estimates. The strategic e¤ect, , is under-
estimated because ignoring market random errors that generate correlation between entry
decisions of rms blurs the true harshness of strategic interaction. The last restricted model
assumes no market error and no interaction e¤ect ( = 0 and  = 0). These restrictions
degenerate the model to a binary probit model. The model t is the worst in this table.
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Ignoring early-mover advantages again leads to a spurious positive estimate of the size e¤ect.
[Insert Table 4]
Table 5 reports the results of the same comparison for the case of weak strategic e¤ect:
 = 1:0. Overall the results are consistent with the previous table. While misspecicatoin
still leads to substantial bias, the impact of misspecication is smaller when the strategic
e¤ect is smaller.
[Insert Table 5]
The last set of experiments introduces various degrees of randomness in the decision
order. This is motivated by the fact that in many potential applications, the econometrician
may have limited information that reects the true decision order only approximately or with
measurement error. Specically, while the estimated models still assume that the rms make
decisions in order of nroute, I modify the data generating process in such a way that the true
decision order is determined by a weighted sum of nroute and a random variable that follows
a uniform distribution with the same mean and variance as nroute. Thus, the weight of this
uniform random variable captures the level of imprecision of the decision order information
used in the estimation. Table 6 reports the results for di¤erent degrees of randomness. The
results indicate that when the econometrician correctly species more than about 85 percent
of the decision order, the di¤erences between the estimated coe¢ cients and their population
values are smaller than the estimated standard error.
[Insert Table 6]
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6 DISCUSSION AND EXTENSIONS
6.1 The Perfect Information Assumption
The perfect information assumption plays a key role in guaranteeing a unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium. The uniqueness is necessary to specify the domain of integration in the
" space for each strategy prole that rationalizes the observed game outcome, without mak-
ing a strong assumption on the equilibrium selection mechanism. The perfect information
assumption, however, may be too strong in many applications. The assumption does not hold
when some players have private information, when players move simultaneously, and when
"nature" may bring in uncertainty. Relaxing the perfect information assumption is possible
as long as the uniqueness of an equilibrium is guaranteed for any possible values of random
shocks, ". In general the following approaches potentially help to relax the perfect informa-
tion assumption. First, we can specify the game and payo¤ function in such a way that a
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is guaranteed. Second, focusing on a set of equilibria
might provide uniqueness. An example is an entry game in which the identity of entering
rms is not uniquely determined but the number of entrants is uniquely determined (Berry,
1992). Third, an equilibrium concept that is stronger than subgame-perfection may help to
avoid the multiplicity of equilibria. For example, sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson,
1982) may reduce the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy proles when decision
nodes that are never reached exist (Litan and Pimienta, 2008). Fourth, some equilibrium
selection mechanism can be assumed. The use of the notions of Pareto and risk-dominance
33
may provide a reasonable option if it leads to a unique equilibrium.
6.2 Decision Order
The entry game example in the previous section assumes that each rm makes a decision
sequentially. In general, the proposed method allows players to take multiple turns alter-
nately. In simulating the likelihood function, all turns of player i must be simulated at once,
as the strategy of each player consists of a decision at every decision node.
A more fundamental issue on decision order is the empirical analogue of decision order.
The proposed method utilizes a publicly known exogenous decision order. In some applica-
tions, even if sequential interaction appears likely, such decision order may not be available
or may be endogenously determined. The above Monte Carlo experiments illustrate that
misspecifying the true decision order may lead to a signicantly biased estimate of strategic
e¤ect. At the same time, if the game is correctly specied except for decision order, we can
draw an inference about not only structural parameters but also decision order. Specically,
the econometrician can estimate di¤erent models, each with a di¤erent imposed decision
order, then conduct a model selection test for non-nested specications. Advancing this idea
further, estimation of the population decision order by selecting the decision order that max-
imizes the likelihood function may be a possibility. The statistical properties of an estimated
decision order and how to deal with the discontinuity that arises from maximization over
decision orders are left for future research.13
13Endogenizing the order of decision is another possible extension. This class of games is called a leadership
game or a commitment game (Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990) and has attracted some theoretical applications
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6.3 Computational Feasibility
For applications with relatively simple games, the computation burden of the proposed
estimation procedure is fairly manageable. This is due to the high performance of the GHK
simulator. Conducting all the Monte Carlo experiments shown in this paper requires less
than a half day with a standard high-end DELL desktop computer purchased in 2007.
However, as the number of players, the number of turns, or the number of alternatives
increases, the size of the game tree increases exponentially and computation quickly be-
comes infeasible. Though this exponential computational burden is inherent in the nature
of sequential games, the following computation techniques may signicantly reduce compu-
tational burden. First, structures of payo¤ function and strategic interaction implied by
assumed economic theory can be utilized to skip the unnecessary part of the calculation in
the backward induction algorithm. In the above entry game example, the assumed negative
e¤ect of a rivals entry excludes one strategy ("imitate" in Figure 2) from the simulation
procedure. In Maruyama (2011), I exploit the non-increasing property of the prot func-
tion in the number of entering rival rms; imposing this structure dramatically reduces the
computation time.
Second, given the assumed independence across each game play, parallel computing is a
promising way to reduce computational burden; the parallelization of the maximum likeli-
hood evaluation loop is straightforward. Third, variance reduction techniques will enhance
(e.g. Kempf and Rota-Graziosi, 2010). These games endogenize the order by introducing a pre-play stage
that determines the order of decision. Consequently, these games are no longer perfect information games, but
as long as a unique outcome is secured, estimation may be possible, as discussed in the previous subsection.
However, the empirical analogue of leadership games seems to be rather unclear.
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the performance of the simulator. The Monte Carlo experiments above show the gain from
antithetic sampling. Instead of using pseudo-random numbers, systematic simulation draws
by quasi-Monte Carlo sampling, such as Halton sequences, and sampling methods based on
orthogonal arrays will produce better performance (Train, 2003; Sándor and András, 2004).
Lastly another potential avenue is the use of a more e¢ cient importance-sampling algorithm
to enhance the GHK simulator (Liesenfeld and Richard, 2010).
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Table 1: EXAMPLE OF DATA SET: DISTRIBUTION OF MARKETS BY NUMBER OF
ENTRANTS
Number of Number of potential entrants
actual entrants 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
(a)  = 1:0 0 317 244 176 59 14 6 766
1 239 368 296 161 64 8 1,201
2 0 182 230 140 55 9 612
3 0 0 144 92 40 11 272
4 0 0 0 76 24 8 104
5 0 0 0 0 18 8 34
6 0 0 0 0 0 11 11
(b)  = 2:0 0 317 244 176 59 14 6 816
1 239 442 429 250 102 15 1,477
2 0 108 187 149 66 21 531
3 0 0 54 52 20 10 136
4 0 0 0 18 12 4 34
5 0 0 0 0 1 3 4
6 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Total 556 794 846 528 215 61 3,000
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Table 2: EXAMPLE OF DATA SET: NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS AND ENTRY
PROFITABILITY BY AIRLINES
Airline ID Number of Entry frequency
observations  = 1:0  = 2:0
1 2,091 1,005 48.1% 930 44.5%
2 1,931 934 48.4% 779 40.3%
3 1,589 724 45.6% 565 35.6%
4 1,379 628 45.5% 448 32.5%
5 803 361 45.0% 249 31.0%
6 442 205 46.4% 144 32.6%
Total 8,235 3,857 46.8% 3,115 37.8%
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Table 3: POTENTIAL SIMULATION BIAS:  = 2.0
20 draws no antithetics 20 draws 40 draws 100 draws
DGP  b ASE MSE b ASE MSE b ASE MSE b ASE MSE
cons  5:0  5:086 0:146 0:133  5:081 0:147 0:130  5:078 0:147 0:127  5:077 0:147 0:128
pop 1:2 1:204 0:032 0:027 1:207 0:032 0:027 1:207 0:032 0:027 1:208 0:032 0:027
dist 0:0 0:008 0:022 0:019 0:008 0:022 0:019 0:008 0:022 0:019 0:008 0:022 0:019
pastp 0:4 0:402 0:018 0:018 0:402 0:018 0:017 0:402 0:018 0:017 0:401 0:018 0:017
city2 1:5 1:521 0:041 0:040 1:517 0:041 0:037 1:516 0:041 0:036 1:516 0:041 0:036
nroute 0:0 0:016 0:033 0:027 0:012 0:033 0:024 0:011 0:033 0:023 0:010 0:033 0:023
 2:0 1:986 0:074 0:083 1:997 0:074 0:077 2:001 0:074 0:076 2:003 0:074 0:076
 0:7 0:677 0:029 0:033 0:685 0:029 0:026 0:688 0:029 0:027 0:689 0:029 0:025
LogL  3136:85  3134:57  3133:95  3133:84
Note: Monte Carlo experiments for 20 independent data sets with 3,000 markets. DGP   parameter values used
to generate data, b average parameter estimate, ASE  average asymptotic standard error, MSE  root mean
squared error, LogL  average log likelihood value.
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Table 4: RESTRICTED MODELS:  = 2.0
Full Model No Order Info No Market Error Probit
DGP  b ASE MSE b ASE MSE b ASE MSE b ASE MSE
cons  5:0  5:078 0:147 0:127  5:417 0:141 0:427  5:241 0:129 0:260  4:474 0:126 0:534
pop 1:2 1:207 0:032 0:027 1:077 0:031 0:124 1:072 0:026 0:130 0:625 0:021 0:575
dist 0:0 0:008 0:022 0:019 0:007 0:020 0:017 0:007 0:017 0:017 0:006 0:020 0:014
pastp 0:4 0:402 0:018 0:017 0:413 0:019 0:022 0:423 0:019 0:029 0:391 0:018 0:019
city2 1:5 1:516 0:041 0:036 1:576 0:039 0:083 1:627 0:039 0:131 1:561 0:036 0:072
nroute 0:0 0:011 0:033 0:023 0:281 0:028 0:282 0:180 0:031 0:182 0:382 0:027 0:383
 2:0 2:001 0:074 0:076 1:460 0:070 0:543 1:416 0:051 0:588
 0:7 0:688 0:029 0:027 0:466 0:041 0:237
LogL / BIC  3133:95 / 6339.95  3218:43 / 6508.92  3200:29 / 6472.63  3609:46 / 7290.99
Note: 40 simulation draws with antithetic sampling for 20 data sets with 3,000 markets. DGP   parameter
values to generate data, b  average parameter estimate, ASE  average asymptotic standard error, MSE 
root mean squared error, LogL  average log likelihood value, BIC  average Bayesian information criterion.
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Table 5: RESTRICTED MODELS:  = 1.0
Full Model No Order Info No Market Error Probit
DGP  b ASE MSE b ASE MSE b ASE MSE b ASE MSE
cons  5:0  5:046 0:140 0:130  5:183 0:139 0:217  4:986 0:121 0:122  4:786 0:126 0:242
pop 1:2 1:204 0:032 0:031 1:172 0:032 0:041 1:048 0:024 0:155 0:893 0:022 0:308
dist 0:0 0:005 0:021 0:019 0:005 0:020 0:019 0:006 0:016 0:019 0:006 0:017 0:018
pastp 0:4 0:401 0:018 0:017 0:409 0:018 0:019 0:416 0:018 0:024 0:418 0:018 0:024
city2 1:5 1:506 0:042 0:034 1:541 0:041 0:051 1:602 0:038 0:105 1:633 0:038 0:138
nroute 0:0 0:007 0:028 0:022 0:087 0:026 0:089 0:108 0:029 0:111 0:167 0:028 0:169
 1:0 0:993 0:064 0:075 0:859 0:060 0:155 0:489 0:035 0:513
 0:7 0:690 0:028 0:029 0:637 0:029 0:070
LogL / BIC  3329:17 / 6730:40  3341:70 / 6755:45  3431:66 / 6935:39  3464:88 / 7001:83
Note: 40 simulation draws with antithetic sampling for 20 data sets with 3,000 markets. DGP   parameter
values to generate data, b  average parameter estimate, ASE  average asymptotic standard error, MSE 
root mean squared error, LogL  average log likelihood value, BIC  average Bayesian information criterion.
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Table 6: EFFECT OF RANDOMNESS IN DECISION ORDER
Randomness misspecied  (0 = 2:0)  (0 = 0:7)
in sequence order (%) b ASE MSE b ASE MSE LogL
0% 0.0% 2:001 0:074 0:076 0:688 0:029 0:027  3133:95
10% 0.0% 2:001 0:074 0:076 0:688 0:029 0:027  3133:95
20% 1.8% 1:992 0:075 0:080 0:683 0:029 0:029  3135:86
30% 13.0% 1:928 0:075 0:111 0:654 0:031 0:052  3154:22
40% 25.7% 1:857 0:076 0:161 0:623 0:033 0:081  3176:04
50% 37.1% 1:801 0:077 0:209 0:596 0:034 0:107  3199:64
60% 45.9% 1:754 0:077 0:254 0:573 0:036 0:130  3218:71
70% 52.4% 1:717 0:077 0:291 0:560 0:037 0:145  3233:78
80% 57.2% 1:696 0:077 0:311 0:554 0:037 0:151  3243:32
90% 60.9% 1:679 0:077 0:327 0:547 0:038 0:157  3250:80
100% 63.8% 1:669 0:077 0:338 0:544 0:038 0:161  3251:66
Note: misspecied order indicates how many observations are assigned with di¤erent decision
order. b;b  average parameter estimate, ASE  average asymptotic standard error, MSE 
root mean squared error, LogL  average log likelihood value. Experiments based on
40 simulation draws using antithetic sampling for 20 independent data sets with 3,000 market.
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Firm 2: never enter preempted always enter
(Out,In)-(3)
Figure 3: DIVIDING AN OBSERVED MARKET OUTCOME INTO STRATEGY PRO-
FILES
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